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Owner move-in restrictions: 
Cwynar v San Francisco, 2001 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
Complaint alleging that city ordinance prohibiting rental property owners from evicting 
tenants to move into their own property states cause of action for regulatory taking. 
Cwynar v City & County of San Francisco (2001) 90 CA4th 637, 109 CR2d 233 
Rental property owners (plaintiffs) challenged a San Francisco (City) ordinance (Prop G) that 
restricts a property owner’s ability to evict a tenant from a residential unit to permit the owner or 
close family member to occupy the unit. Plaintiffs sued for inverse condemnation, among other 
causes, claiming that the ordinance was unconstitutional in that it deprived them of the right to 
occupy their private property and to exclude others from it. The trial court sustained the City’s 
demurrer.  
The court of appeal reversed. The state and federal constitutions guarantee property owners 
just compensation if their property is taken for public use, including a taking by government 
regulation. A per se taking occurs as a matter of law when government action brings about a 
permanent physical invasion of the property or when it deprives the owner of all economically 
beneficial or productive use of the land. Regulation that falls short of a per se taking may still 
constitute a regulatory taking if government action (1) does not substantially advance legitimate 
state interests, or (2) disproportionately affects the property owner, compared with the 
community at large. 
Plaintiffs argued that Prop G constituted a per se physical taking because it deprived plaintiffs 
of their right to occupy their own property and exclude others; tenants, in effect, had a right to 
lifetime occupancy. The court agreed—“at this [demurrer] stage of the proceedings”—holding 
that the taking was both direct and permanent. The City had argued that the tenancies were not 
coerced as a matter of law. Although most plaintiffs had voluntarily rented out their property, 
some had purchased occupied rental property already subject to Prop G. The court held that 
plaintiffs should have the opportunity to prove that the challenged ordinance compels them to 
rent the property and forever refrain from terminating the tenancy. The court rejected the City’s 
contention that the Ellis Act (Govt C §§7060–7060.7) counteracted the coercive aspects of 
Proposition G by preserving a landlord’s right to get out of the rental business. “The question is 
not whether the property owner is a landlord by choice. The question is whether the regulation at 
issue authorizes a compelled permanent physical occupation of the landlord’s property.” 109 
CR2d at 250. 
Regarding the regulatory taking theory, the court expressed doubt as to whether the City could 
show that the regulation substantially advanced a legitimate state interest—namely, whether 
there was a “sufficient nexus between the effect of the ordinance and the objectives it is 
supposed to advance.” 109 CR2d at 250. The City argued that the court’s review of the ordinance 
should be deferential. The court disagreed, because (1) Prop G differed from typical rent 
ordinances—it doesn’t simply regulate rents, it regulates occupancy—and (2) Prop G was not 
generally applicable—it created several different categories of property and owners (e.g., 
depending on the date of acquisition of the property and the number of owners). Therefore, the 
ordinance does not qualify for deference, but should be closely scrutinized because it directly 
affects possessory property rights of an arbitrary category of property owners. Furthermore, the 
record does not establish that the ordinance substantially advances a legitimate government 
interest.  
Finally, the court found that plaintiffs had alleged facts sufficient to support a possible finding 
of regulatory taking under the ordinance: (1) substantial interference with their rightful use and 
enjoyment of the properties in conflict with their expectations (including occupancy by close 
relatives); (2) no counterbalancing rights or benefits to mitigate their burdens under the 
ordinance; and (3) no hardship provision or procedure for individualized treatment or 
consideration.  
The court rejected various grounds advanced opposing a regulatory taking, holding that the 
City’s arguments were based on per se taking rules rather than a regulatory taking analysis. The 
court remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: After more or less ripping San Francisco’s anti-owner-move-in 
ordinance to shreds, the court of appeal says property-owning plaintiffs “must allege facts 
establishing not only government authorized coercion, but also permanent occupation of their 
rental property,” adding that this may be “difficult” to do. Given the tenor of the opinion, I don’t 
see what the difficulty is. 
The City’s regulation was indefinite in terms of duration. That is to be expected since short-
term protection would not give tenants much solace. Absent any kind of sunset provision in the 
ordinance, it looks to me as though the permanence feature is as “per se” as is the taking itself. 
(An ordinance that merely interposed some kind of delay into the eviction process might survive 
the “permanence” standard and might also give tenants some helpful breathing time to find 
replacement premises in a crowded, expensive market, but it would not prevent their ultimate 
removal, and would achieve nothing like what this ordinance sought to do.)  
Furthermore, although these judges did not say so explicitly, it appears to me that they have 
also held that the ordinance effects a per se taking of the landlord’s right to possess her property 
through “government authorized coercion.” If the plaintiffs have only to show that “the 
challenged ordinance has the effect of compelling them to rent property or to refrain in 
perpetuity from terminating a tenancy,” what more is there to prove: The wording of the 
ordinance declares that it does exactly what the court declares the plaintiffs have to prove that it 
does. (The court’s position is so strong on this point that it makes me wonder whether even a 
just-cause eviction requirement, common in so many rent control ordinances, could survive this 
test; since both just-cause and owner-move-in limitations have that same compulsory and 
lifetiming effect.)  
Given these concerns, I can see why the City felt the need to hide behind the affirmative 
defenses that (1) the landlords had voluntarily put themselves in that position and (2) the Ellis 
Act afforded them sufficient protection. But, since the plaintiffs had cleverly included in their 
party an owner whose purchase came after the unit she wanted to occupy was already rented, 
they could easily evade the “voluntary” argument. Although the ordinance could be amended to 
bar owner-move-ins only where the owner had done the leasing, that stratagem could be 
circumvented by having those validly restricted owners merely sell their building to new owners 
desirous of occupying. (And even the preexisting landlords could argue that the voluntary terms 
of their leasing never included waivers of owner-move-in rights, which existed before any new 
ordinance restrictions took effect.)  
Regarding the Ellis Act defense, the City’s attempt to convert the Act from a sword into a 
shield clearly didn’t work. The court rejected that argument, first, on the ground that the Act 
does not entitle a landlord to pick out a single unit in a larger building and pull that one off the 
market, and, second, by holding that the right to remove property from the market is no defense 
to a claim that the government has already taken that property by prohibiting eviction of the 
tenant. With respect to the first refutation, I’m not that sure that the Act does not permit a multi-
unit owner to pull a single unit off the market, but that will have to wait until it comes up on its 
own merits. (New York landlords “warehouse” a lot of residential units, hoping to tip the voting 
balance favorably when they try to condominiumize a building.) Regarding the second, it would 
have been surprising if the legislature’s desire to prevent cities from forcing their landlords to 
stay in the rental business had then been turned against those landlords and interpreted to mean 
that the legislated ability to leave the market was intended to destroy the constitutional ability to 
claim that other local regulations imposed on them took their property.  
All of the above concerned only the per se physical taking issue. The court’s holdings on 
regulatory takings seem even more ominous for the City. First, there is to be no deferential 
review, because the case involves rights to possession rather than rights to increased income. In 
the past, deferential review saved a lot of rent control regulation from the academic and 
empirical attacks of economists and demographers (see, for instance, the concurring opinion of 
Judge Posner in Chicago Bd. of Realtors v City of Chicago (7th Cir 1987) 819 F2d 732), and its 
loss is surely a blow to the activities of many rent-controlled communities.  
Second, coverage is adjudged arbitrary because buildings built after the enactment of rent 
control are exempt, and because multi-owner buildings are treated differently from single-owner 
ones. Those will be difficult features to correct. New construction generally has to be exempted 
from rent control rules, or else no one will build; and applying restrictions to post-1979 buildings 
as well as pre-1979 ones (the ordinance specifically does not apply to rental units in buildings 
constructed after June 13, 1979) can easily deter new construction. Conversely, on the multi-
/single-owner distinction, extending the exemption for single owners to larger groups of owners 
only means abandonment of the City’s many attempts to prohibit tenancy-in-common (TIC) 
conversions, a currently popular way to acquire ownership of a residential unit at an affordable 
price. 
Third, the City failed to show that the ordinance achieved a “reasonable balance between 
owner occupied and rental housing.” In a city whose housing units are acknowledged as already 
mostly rental, it seems unlikely that adequate proof of such a conclusion will be forthcoming at a 
trial. (And such proof is complicated by the court’s additional observations that the City did not 
take into account either the landlords’ individual needs or the fact that the ordinance makes it 
easier for wealthier single owners to evict than for poorer multiple TIC owners to do so.) 
Fourth, the City’s claim that the ordinance ensured protection of affordable rental housing was 
held contradicted by the prospect that (1) it might encourage more Ellis Acting, which would 
reduce the sum total of such housing, (2) poorer potential owners won’t be able to form TIC 
groups to buy multi-unit buildings, (3) landlords won’t be able to let their children move into 
their own (landlords’) buildings, and (4) rich tenants will get as much protection as poor ones (as 
has certainly turned out to be the case in much of the rent-controlled housing in New York City). 
What kind of proof can the City offer to refute those observations? 
Fifth, the City’s goal of protecting elderly and disabled tenants perhaps was held to come at 
the cost of “displacing elderly, ill, or disabled property owners and/or relatives of property 
owners who are desperately in need of a home.” How does San Francisco show that that isn’t so? 
Can it produce evidence that there are no elderly or disabled landlords in town, or that they don’t 
really need to move into their own buildings?  
Sixth, the ordinance was said to impose a disproportionate burden on owners by “essentially 
requiring them to forfeit their own homes in order to create public housing.” Forfeiture may be a 
rather strong word here, since the ordinance does not terminate landlords’ right to receive rents 
(although related rent control features compel landlords to forfeit much of the conventional profit 
associated with most economic activities), but it is certainly true that the right to live in what you 
own is eliminated for many tenants in common. And, again, I don’t know what kind of evidence 
will help the City favorably resolve this balancing issue.  
Finally, the ordinance was held to contain no effective mechanism for making hardship 
exceptions. Theoretically, this might be cured by amendment, but I doubt whether the City can 
devise an escape mechanism speedy enough to satisfy the court about protecting landlords, 
which at the same time would be palatable to the two-thirds of the voters who are tenants. The 
speed of an eviction is a zero-sum equation between landlord and tenant. 
And then, after all those criticisms, remain the plaintiffs’ other constitutional claims—equal 
protection, right to travel, family living, right to privacy, and vagueness. These are mentioned 
but not discussed in this opinion, but they lurk in the background as additional threats.  
A decade ago, New York’s high court threw out a somewhat similar New York City ordinance 
requiring landlords of single-room occupancy buildings to continue renting them at controlled 
rents. See Seawall Assocs. v City of New York (1989) 544 NYS2d 542, 542 NE2d 1059. It did so 
by way of summary judgment rather than on the pleadings, giving its decision far more 
effectiveness and finality than the one in this case. But the language of the California Court of 
Appeal shows that it has no more patience with what San Francisco did than the New York Court 
of Appeals had with the Big Apple’s approach. —Roger Bernhardt 
 
